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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
contribution and indemnity should be the same. This understanding is
substantially consistent with the subsequently amended CPLR 1402,
which precludes the enforcement of a Dole claim for contribution until
the party has paid more than his apportioned share of liability.223 Ac-
cordingly, Adams is not at all incongruous with the practicalities and
fairness embodied in the recent modification of section 1402.
Intrafamily Torts
In Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc.224 and Ryan v. Fahey,2 2 5
the Second and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division en-
dorsed a recent Third Department decision, Holodook v. Spencer,226
concerning intrafamily torts. Considering the question of whether a
parent owes a legal duty of supervision to his child, with a cause of
action accruing to the injured child upon a breach of such duty, both
courts answered in the negative. In light of Dole, the conclusion that
such a claim is impermissible is of particular importance. 227
223 CPLR 1402, as amended, reads as follows:
Amount of contribution. The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled
shall be the excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judg-
ment recovered by the injured party; but no person shall be required to contribute
an amount greater than his equitable share. The equitable share shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person liable for
contribution.
I N.Y. SEss. LAWs [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney) (emphasis added). Prior to the enact-
ment of article 14, the Supreme Court, Kings County, in Mazelis v. Wallerstein, 77 Misc.
2d 335, 353 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974), held that to the extent one of the
defendants pays more than his apportioned share of liability, he may bring an action for
contribution. Id. at 340, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
224 44 App. Div. 2d 127, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1974).
225 43 App. Div. 2d 429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (4th Dep't 1974).
226 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973), discussed in The Survey,
48 ST. JoHN's L. RIv. 611, 650 (1974). In Holodook, a four-year-old infant, while running
between parked cars, was struck by the defendant's automobile. The Supreme Court,
Columbia County, denied a motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim against the
infant's father and a third-party action against the infant's mother, both of which in-
volved requests for Dole apportionments. 73 Misc. 2d 181, 340 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct.
Columbia County 1973). With one judge dissenting, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, reversed, holding the Dole claims to be legally insufficient. 43 App. Div. 2d at 137,
350 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
In a companion case, Graney v. Graney, 43 App. Div. 2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d
Dep't 1973), the Third Department affirmed a trial court order dismissing a direct child-
parent suit based upon a claim of negligent supervision.
227Where negligent supervision of an infant is alleged, the claimant is essentially
arguing that the parent had failed to supervise and protect the injured infant, thereby
contributing to his injury. The existence of such a theory has been the subject of a great
deal of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (claim allowed); Northrop v. Hogstyn, 75 Misc. 2d 486, 348 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.
Ontario County 1973) (claim disallowed); Searles v. Dardani, 75 Misc. 2d 279, 347 N.Y.S.2d
662 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973) (claim allowed). See generally Dachs, Seider v. Roth
Upstaged by Dole v. Dow Chemical, 169 N.Y.L.J. 22, Jan. 31, 1973, at 1, col. 5; McLaughlin,
New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 92, May 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
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In Ryan, the hand of the three-year-old plaintiff was run over by a
lawnmower operated by a neighbor's child. At the time of the accident,
the plaintiff's mother and the neighbor were in the latter's home. Acting
in both an individual and representative capacity, the father of the in-
jured infant brought a negligence action against the infant's mother,
the neighbor, and the neighbor's son. The negligence of the two adult
defendants allegedly consisted of their failure to properly supervise
their children. Reversing the Supreme Court, Monroe County, the
Fourth Department upheld the motion made by the mother of the in-
fant plaintiff to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.228
In Lastowski, the father of an infant commenced an action to re-
cover for injuries sustained by the child in an automobile accident in-
volving a vehicle owned by the defendant. Seeking a Dole apportion-
ment of damages, the defendant counterclaimed against the father, con-
tending that the infant's injuries were due to negligent parental super-
vision. The Second Department granted the father's motion to dismiss
the counterclaim, holding that the defendant had failed to allege an
actionable tort.229
Both the Ryan and Lastowski courts determined that despite
abolition of the intrafamily tort immunity doctrine in Gelbman v.
Gelbman,230 no tort of negligent supervision currently exists.231 Further-
more, no such tort had been recognized prior to adoption of the intra-
family immunity rule in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino.282 In so holding, both
courts referred to Judge Burke's conclusion in Gelbman that by
"abolishing the defense of intrafamily tort immunity for nonwillful
torts, we are not creating liability where none previously existed.
Rather, we are permitting recovery, previously denied, after liability
228 43 App. Div. 2d at 433, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 287. At trial, the defendant-neighbor
cross-claimed against the defendant-mother, seeking a Dole apportionment of damages.
The sufficiency of this cross-daim was not decided by the Fourth Department. Id. at 431,
352 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
229 44 App. Div. 2d at 128, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
23023 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.2d 529 (1969). In Gelbman, a plaintiff
injured in an automobile accident brought suit against her 16-year-old son, the operator
of one of the motor vehicles involved in the collision. Relying in large measure upon the
dissenting opinion of Judge Fuld in Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E2.d 718, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961), the Court of Appeals held that henceforth intrafamily suits for non-
willful torts would be recognized in New York. 23 N.Y.2d at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297
N.YS.2d at 531. In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically overruled the decision
that had introduced the intrafamily tort immunity rule, Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y.
626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
281 Ryan v. Fahey, 43 App. Div. 2d 429, 433, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (4th Dep't 1974);
Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 127, 131, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432, 436
(2d Dep't 1974).
232 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 "(1928).
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has been established."23 In firmly asserting the nonexistence of a neg-
ligent supervision tort, the two courts 'rejected earlier trial level
opinions which had suggested that recovery might be had if special
circumstances concerning the injured infant were alleged, such as men-
tal or physical disability, or non sui juris status.23 4
Dissenting in Lastowski, Justice Hopkins contended that with the
complete abrogation of intrafamily tort immunity in Gelbman, the
sole bar to the assertion of a cause of action grounded upon negligent
supervision had been removed.23 5 Accordingly, he argued that negligent
supervision is an actionable tort and suggested that a "reasonable
parent '230 standard be imposed as the criterion for determining whether
the duty of supervision has been breached.
23323 N.Y.2d at 439, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.YS.2d at 532.
234 See, e.g., Miller v. Cross, 75 Misc. 2d 940, 349 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1973); Kierman v. Jones, 73 Misc. 2d 829, 342 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973);
Fake v. Terminal Hardware, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 39, 341 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1973).
In Miller, the Supreme Court, Orange County, observed:
If a child is alleged to have been 4 years old or below at the time of the accident
and therefore non sui furis as a matter of law, the age of the child is in and of
itself a special circumstance which creates a special responsibility for a parent to
supervise and therefore also creates a recognizable cause of action over against
the parent under Dole v. Dow ....
75 Misc. 2d at 940-41, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
235 Justice Hopkins concluded that prior to adoption of the intrafamily tort immunity
doctrine in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 NYE. 551 (1928), the Court of
Appeals had recognized claims grounded upon allegations of negligent supervision of
infants in Longacre v. Yonkers R.R., 236 N.Y. 119, 140 N.E. 215 (1923), and Mangam v.
Brooklyn R.1L, 58 N.Y. 455 (1868). 44 App. Div. 2d at 139, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 444-45
(Hopkins, J., dissenting). Such a conclusion is of significance in view of the holding by
the Court of Appeals in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 NXE.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), that in abrogating the intrafamily immunity rule, the Court did not
intend to create 'liability where none previously existed." Id. at 439, 245 NE.2d at 194,
297 N.Y.S.2d at 532. Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), was
also cited by Justice Hopkins as authortiy for the existence of a negligent supervision
cause of action.
The majority in Lastowski did not directly analyze this line of argument. However,
the Fourth Department in Ryan pursued the issue and found the cases cited by Justice
Hopkins to be inapposite. Longacre and Mangam, it was observed, dealt with the duty
of supervision owed by a parent not to his child, but to a third party. 43 App. Div. 2d
at 433, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 287. Sorrentino was distinguished as being limited to Dole cases and
therefore inapplicable to a direct suit by an infant against his parent. Additionally, the
Sorrentino court relied upon Holodook v. Spencer, 73 Misc. 2d 181, 340 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. Columbia County 1973), which was subsequently reversed by the Third Department.
43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1975).
23644 App. Div. 2d at 142-43, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 448-49 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
Justice Gulotta also dissented from the Lastowski decision, but on a ground different from
that advanced by Justice Hopkins. Justice Gulotta concluded that some form of a
modified negligent supervision theory should be recognized as actionable. He suggested
that the rule adopted in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), might
present a "workable compromise between the need to preserve some freedom of action
on the part of a parent and the need to protect the child." 44 App. Div. 2d at 150, 355
N.Y.S.2d at 455 (Gulotta, J., dissenting). In Golter, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in
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Ryan and Lastowski indicate that where a suit or a counterclaim
for Dole apportionment is predicated upon the alleged negligent exer-
cise of parental supervision over a child, a court will disallow the action
or counterclaim. Such a result is appropriate, since to permit such suits
would result in a jury second-guessing the day-to-day conduct of the
parent. Furthermore, in evaluating a parent's supervision of his child,
no readily definable standards could be applied, inasmuch as the obliga-
tion of the parent is essentially moral. 237 Moreover, if the courts were to
attempt to crystallize such an obligation, the result would be an inter-
ference with the freedom traditionally permitted a parent in the rearing
of his offspring. The Second and Fourth Departments have wisely con-
cluded that decisions concerning the supervision of children should re-
main with parents as a moral rather than legal duty.
eliminating the parental immunity rule in that jurisdiction, excepted acts involving
parental authority and the "exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the
provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." 20
Wis. 2d at 406, 122 N.W.2d at 198. Justice Gulotta conceded that the Goller rule would
require further judicial refinement, particularly with respect to whether "other care"
included negligent supervision, before it could be applied in New York. 44 App. Div. 2d
at 151, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
237 Despite Justice Hopkins' suggestion in Lastowski that a "reasonable parent"
standard could be used as the criterion for determining whether a parental duty to super-
vise has been breached, the three departments of the Appellate Division passing on the
question have declined to impose such a standard. See Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic,
Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 127, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1974); Ryan v. Fahey, 43 App. Div. 2d
429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 288 (4th Dep't 1974); Holodook v. Spencer, 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 850
N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973), discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JonN's L. REV. 611, 650
(1974). Responding to Justice Hopkins' suggestion, Justice Shapiro observed in his
majority opinion in Lastowslki:
[Tihe fact is that his proposed standard, the "fictional" reasonable parent, is so
"flexible" as to constitute no standard at all, depending as it would have to on
innumerable variables such as the number and ages of the children and the
differing economic, educational, cultural, ethnic, religious, physical, social and
health background of the particular family involved.
44 App. Div. 2d at 136, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
